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INTRODUCTION
For twenty-four years, an incorrect circuit court decision has
effectively eliminated a federal remedy for state employees suffering
from age discrimination in employment.1 In 1989, the Fourth Circuit
in Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department concluded that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is the exclusive remedy
for age-based employment discrimination.2 Specifically, the court held
that the ADEA precludes3 § 1983 claims based on violations of the
* J.D. candidate, Labor and Employment Law Certificate candidate, May 2013,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Michigan State
University, B.A., Political Science/Pre-Law, August 2009. To my Mother, Father,
and Samantha: Thank you for your support.
1
See Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp. 2d
945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002).
2
868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989).
3
Preemption refers to situations where federal law displaces state law. See
generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Misinterpreting “Sounds of Silence”: Why
Courts Should Not “Imply” Congressional Preclusion of § 1983 Constitutional
Claims, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 806 (2008). “Preclusion” will be used in this
Comment to describe situations where a federal statute forecloses a remedy under
another federal statute or the Constitution.
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Until 2012,
no circuit court to consider the issue disagreed with Zombro.5
Section 19836 was created “to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people . . . to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law.”7 The statute does not
contain any substantive rights; it provides individuals with a federal
cause of action to remedy violations of other federal laws or the
Constitution.8 Congress has the authority to replace § 1983, or any
other statute, with an alternative remedy.9 However, the courts
ultimately determine whether or not Congress intended to preclude a
specific remedy.10
In Smith v. Robinson and in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n (Sea Clammers), the Supreme Court
established two tests to determine whether or not Congress intended to
preclude § 1983 claims.11 The Sea Clammers doctrine evaluates
whether Congress, by enacting a federal statute, intended to preclude
4

Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370.
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2009); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other
grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by
Migneault v. Peck, 204 F.3d 1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000); Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t
of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1997); Rodrock v. Moury, No. 09–2383, 379
F. App’x 164, 165 (3d Cir. May 11, 2010).
6
Section 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2006).
7
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
8
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979).
9
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
10
Id.
11
Id.; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
5
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§ 1983 claims based on statutory violations.12 Alternatively, the test
from Smith applies to the preclusion of § 1983 claims predicated on
constitutional violations.13
The question before the Fourth Circuit in Zombro was: Does the
ADEA preclude § 1983 claims based on violations of the Equal
Protection Clause?14 The Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied the Sea
Clammers preclusion analysis reserved for statute-based § 1983
claims.15 Inexplicably, most circuit courts have relied on the reasoning
of the Fourth Circuit and engaged in little independent analysis.16
In 2012, a Seventh Circuit panel comprised of Judges Kanne,
Posner, and Bauer stepped out of the shadow of Zombro and its
progeny.17 In Levin v. Madigan, Judge Kanne, writing for a unanimous
court, held that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 equal protection
claims.18 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit in Levin applied an improper
analysis. Nevertheless, the decision is significant given its divergence
from the weight of authority19 and its unique analysis: It is the only
12

Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 1.
Smith, 468 U.S. 992.
14
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989).
15
Id. at 1367.
16
See Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2009) (the court found the Zombro reasoning “particularly persuasive”); Migneault
v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000) (the court relied on
Zombro and stated it was unnecessary to repeat the court’s reasoning); Lafleur v.
Tex. Dep't of Health, 126 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1997) (the court relied on the weight of
authority, including Zombro, holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment).
17
Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012).
18
Id. at 622.
19
See Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370 (the ADEA precludes § 1983 equal protection
claims); Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003) (ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination); Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057 (the ADEA
precludes § 1983 equal protection claims); Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1140 (refused to
recognize equal protection claims to remedy age discrimination in employment);
Lafleur, 126 F.3d at 760 (Section 1983 claim of age discrimination was preempted
by ADEA where facts alleged did not support a § 1983 claim); Chennareddy v.
Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination); Britt v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d 1441, 1449 (5th Cir.
13
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circuit to compare the rights and protections of the ADEA to the rights
and protections of a § 1983 equal protection claim. The Seventh
Circuit’s decision undoubtedly changes the legal landscape, and more
importantly, it gives state employees a federal forum to vindicate age
discrimination in employment.
This Comment argues that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy
for age discrimination in employment. Part I will provide a description
of the relevant statutes: the ADEA and § 1983. This Section will also
discuss how the Equal Protection Clause is implicated in age-based
employment discrimination. Part II will outline the underlying legal
precedent. Specifically, it will discuss how the Supreme Court has
limited the availability of § 1983 relief. Part III will present the circuit
split; it will illustrate how the circuit courts have overwhelmingly
applied an improper preclusion analysis concerning the ADEA’s
preclusion of § 1983 equal protection claims. This Section will also
discuss the implications and significance of the Seventh Circuit’s
Levin decision. Based on Supreme Court precedent, Part IV will
propose the proper standard for courts to utilize when determining
whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 claims predicated on
constitutional rights. Finally, Part V will apply this Comment’s
proposed standard to the ADEA and § 1983. By expanding on the
Seventh Circuit’s comparative evaluation, this Comment concludes
that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 equal protection claims.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE STATUTES
In order to examine whether or not the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) precludes § 1983 equal protection claims, it
is necessary to understand the underlying statutes. This Section
examines § 1983 and the ADEA; it also describes how § 1983 equal
protection claims arise in the context of age-based employment
discrimination.

1992) (“Congress intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination claims”).
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A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. Overview
The ADEA was enacted to “promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; and to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.”20 Substantively, the Act provides that it is unlawful for
an employer to discriminate against an employee because of his or her
age.21 The ADEA is applicable against private employers, the federal
government, employment agencies, and labor unions.22 In 1974,
Congress amended the ADEA and extended application of the ADEA’s
substantive requirements to the States.23 However, in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Congress did not
validly abrogate the States sovereign immunity.24 As such, the States
are immunized from federal suits by private individuals for ADEA
violations.25
The ADEA only protects employees forty years of age and older.26
It also limits or exempts protection for elected officials, specific
members of their staff, firefighters, and law enforcement officers.27

20

Levin, 692 F.3d at 615 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)).
29 U.S.C.A § 623(a)(1) (2006) (an employer cannot “fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s age”).
22
29 U.S.C.A. § 630 (2006).
23
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 68 (2000).
24
Id. at 91. The Eleventh Amendment establishes the principle of sovereign
immunity; the Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
25
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.
26
29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a).
27
Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623(j), 630(f)).
21
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Furthermore, State employees have limited rights under the ADEA
because of the States’ sovereign immunity.28
2. Administrative Requirements
Under the ADEA, an employee subjected to age discrimination
must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).29 Generally, the charge must be filed within 180
days of the misconduct.30 A charge must be filed with the EEOC if the
individual wants to file a civil suit.31 Once a charge is filed, the EEOC
performs an investigation to determine if the employer engaged in
prohibited conduct.32 If the EEOC concludes that a violation of the
ADEA occurred, it will attempt “informal methods of conciliation,
conference, and persuasion” to eliminate the discrimination.33 An
employee can file a civil suit in federal court sixty days after filing a
charge with the EEOC;34 an employee loses the right to file suit if the
EEOC files its own lawsuit to enforce the charge.35
3. Remedies
The ADEA incorporates the remedial provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).36 Specifically, the ADEA authorizes backpay,
reinstatement, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and liquidated
damages.37 Courts also have the authority to award “equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the Act.38
28

Id. (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-92).
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d).
30
Id.
31
Id. at § 626(c)(2)(d)(1).
32
Id. at § 626(a).
33
Id. at § 626(b).
34
Id. at § 626(c)(2)(d)(1)(a).
35
Id. at § 626(c)(1).
36
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995).
37
Id.
38
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b). Liquidated damages are also available but only when a
violation of the ADEA was “willful.” Id.
29
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B. Section 1983
Section 1983 was created as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.39
Congress’ objective was to provide individuals with an avenue to the
unbiased federal forum against state actors acting unconstitutionally.40
Today, § 1983 provides state and local employees with a federal cause
of action for violations of the Constitution and federally created
rights.41 The statute does not contain any substantive rights;42 it
operates as an enforcement mechanism by providing a cause of action
against any “person” acting under color of state law. 43 A § 1983 claim
may be brought against state and local government officials, as well as
municipal and county governments.44
A state actor that violates § 1983 “shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.”45 The central purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to
compensate injuries resulting from the state actor’s unconstitutional
conduct.46
C. Utilizing § 1983 Equal Protection Claims for Age Discrimination in
Employment
The ADEA is not the only remedy available to employees who
suffer from age-based employment discrimination. It is well settled

39

Lindsay Niehaus, The Title IX Problem: Is It Sufficiently Comprehensive to
Preclude § 1983 Actions?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 499, 504 (2009).
40
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
41
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
42
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979).
43
Id. “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that
the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
44
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
45
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
46
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-254 (1978).
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that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids arbitrary age discrimination.47
State employees have brought justiciable equal protection claims
against the States for age classifications affecting employment.48 A
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim based on age
discrimination is subject to a “rational basis” level of scrutiny:49 a
State may discriminate on the basis of age without violating the Equal
Protection Clause so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.”50
Employees use § 1983 to enforce the constitutional right to be free
from age discrimination.51 A state employee discriminated against
because of age can file a charge with the EEOC based on ADEA
violations.52 However, aside from a few exceptions, the States’
sovereign immunity prevents employees from enforcing violations of

47

Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)).
48
See generally Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83; Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (involving equal protection challenge to state statute that
required police officers to retire at age fifty); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991) (State court judges challenged mandatory retirement provision of State law as
violating Equal Protection Clause).
49
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84.
50
Id. at 83.
51
See e.g., Levin, 692 F.3d 607 (plaintiff asserted claims for relief under the
ADEA under § 1983 Equal Protection Clause); Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher
Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff asserted claim under § 1983 against
supervisor for age discrimination in violation Equal Protection Clause); Migneault v.
Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by Migneault v. Peck, 204 F.3d
1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff brought § 1983 equal protection claim to
vindicate alleged age discrimination); Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d
758 (5th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleged “an equal protection violation to
be free from age discrimination in employment”); Mustafa v. State of Nebraska
Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp. 2d 945 (D. Neb. 2002) (employee brought
§ 1983 equal protection claim against employer for alleged age discrimination);
Shapiro v. New York City Dep’t. of Educ., 561 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(teacher asserted § 1983 equal protection claim to vindicate alleged age
discrimination by the municipal board and principal).
52
8-121 Larson on Employment Discrimination § 121.06.
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the ADEA in a federal suit.53 For a state employee to achieve a remedy
under the ADEA, the State must consent to be sued or the EEOC must
bring a suit on behalf of the employee.54 Consequently, state
employees assert § 1983 equal protection claims to remedy age
discrimination in employment.55
II. LIMITING § 1983 CLAIMS: THE PRECLUSION STANDARDS
It is important to recall that § 1983 can be used to vindicate both
statutory and constitutional rights.56 Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme
Court has limited § 1983 relief by creating two distinct tests. The Sea
Clammers test assesses whether a federal statute precludes § 1983
claims based on violations of that same statute.57 The Smith test
determines whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 claims
predicated on constitutional violations.58 This Section outlines the
Supreme Court’s preclusion decisions and summarizes the
applicability of the preclusion tests.
A. Precluding § 1983 Claims Predicated on Statutory Violations
Congress asserts that a federal statute “will not give rise to
liability under § 1983” when it provides a comprehensive enforcement
scheme in the statute.59 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Association (Sea Clammers), the plaintiff
asserted § 1983 claims based on violations of two federal statutes.60
53

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
8-121 Larson on Employment Discrimination § 121.06.
55
See Note 51.
56
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
57
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
58
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
59
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994) (citing Sea Clammers, 453
U.S. at 20).
60
Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 4.
54
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The Court noted that the statutes contained “unusually elaborate”
enforcement provisions.61 For instance, both statutes required
violations to be enforced by a government agency.62 The Court
declared that when Congress includes a comprehensive enforcement
scheme in a federal statute, “the requirements of that enforcement
procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under
§ 1983.”63 Because of the elaborate enforcement provisions, the Court
concluded that the statutes precluded the § 1983 claims.64
The Sea Clammer’s decision specifies that courts can infer
Congress’ intent to preclude a statute-based § 1983 claim when the
remedial scheme provided in that statute is “sufficiently
comprehensive.”65 In later decisions, the Court announced that
Congress’ intent could also be inferred from the context and legislative
history of the statute.66 The Sea Clammers doctrine applies only to
situations where a plaintiff seeks statutory relief under § 1983.67 In the
succeeding Supreme Court cases, the plaintiffs relied on § 1983 to
enforce constitutional rights rather than statutory rights.
B. Precluding § 1983 Claims Predicated on Violations of the
Constitution
In Smith v. Robinson, the plaintiff brought claims under the
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) and § 1983 for violations of

61

Id. at 13.
Id.
63
Id. at 20.
64
Id. at 21.
65
Id. at 20.
66
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (the Court
investigated the legislative history to discover Congress’ intent); City of Rancho
Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“context . . . will often lead a court to Congress' intent in respect to a particular
statute”).
67
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1004-1005.
62
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Before
the Court engaged in a preclusion analysis, it distinguished itself from
Sea Clammers: the Court noted that the plaintiff in Sea Clammers
attempted to “enlarge a statutory remedy by asserting a claim based on
that statute under . . . § 1983.”69 Conversely, the plaintiff in Smith
asserted an EHA claim and a separate constitutional claim under §
1983.70
To determine if the EHA precludes § 1983 equal protection
claims, the Court applied a two-step test.71 First, the Court ascertained
whether the § 1983 claim was “virtually identical” to the EHA claim.72
The Court relied on the court of appeal’s conclusion that the
constitutional claim was equivalent to the statutory claim.73 To the
Court, this indicated that the EHA was set up by Congress “to aid the
States in complying with their constitutional obligations.”74 By
creating federal rights virtually identical to constitutional rights, the
statute incorporated the protections of the Constitution.
Next, the Court examined the EHA for additional congressional
intent to preclude § 1983 equal protection claims. At this stage, the
Court applied what was likely a Sea Clammers analysis. The Court
focused on the EHA’s comprehensive remedial scheme and concluded
that it would be improper to allow plaintiffs to bypass such
enforcement procedures.75 It was apparent to the Court that the EHA,
not § 1983, was “the most effective vehicle for protecting the
constitutional right.”76 According to Smith, the Sea Clammers doctrine
is not determinative of preclusion unless the statutory claim and the
§ 1983 constitutional claim are virtually identical.77
68

Id. at 994-996.
Id. at 1004.
70
Id. at 1004-1005.
71
See generally Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude
Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1470 (1998).
72
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009.
73
Id.
74
Id. (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 1011-1012.
76
Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).
77
Id. at 1009.
69
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More recently, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, the
Supreme Court was faced with the following question: Does Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 preclude § 1983 claims
predicated on Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause?78 The Court
applied both the Sea Clammers doctrine and Smith’s two-step analysis
to determine preclusion: the Court was dealing with a § 1983
constitutional claim and a § 1983 statutory claim.79
First, the Court discussed the importance of congressional intent
as outlined in Sea Clammers.80 Specifically, the Court noted that Title
IX did not contain a comprehensive remedial scheme similar to the
statutes in Sea Clammers.81 Without a comprehensive remedial
scheme, a plaintiff could not bypass Title IX by bringing a § 1983
claim based on violations of Title IX.82 The § 1983 statutory claim was
not precluded.83
To address whether Title IX precludes § 1983 equal protection
claims, the Court engaged in a comparison of the substantive “rights
and protections.”84 The Court determined that the rights and
protections offered under Title IX diverged from the rights and
protections under § 1983 equal protection claims in the following
ways: the claims apply to different actors; the standards of liability are
different; and Title IX exempts conduct that could violate the Equal
Protection Clause.85 The divergent rights lent “further support” to the
Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to be the
“sole means of vindicating the constitutional right.”86 The Court
concluded that neither § 1983 claim was precluded and held that the
legislative history and context of Title IX confirmed this holding.87

78

555 U.S. 246, 250 (2009).
Id.
80
Id. at 252.
81
Id. at 255.
82
Id. at 255-256.
83
Id. at 256.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 256-258.
86
Id. at 256.
87
Id. at 258-259.
79
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III. DOES THE ADEA PRECLUDE § 1983 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS?
THE CIRCUIT COURTS WEIGH IN
Courts should not lightly infer that Congress intended to preclude
§ 1983 as a remedy for Equal Protection Clause violations.88 Keeping
in mind this presumption against implied preclusion, it is difficult to
believe that every circuit court–excluding the Seventh Circuit–to
consider the issue, has found that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy
for age discrimination in employment.89 The Zombro v. Baltimore City
Police Department decision has been dubbed the most important
circuit court decision concerning the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983.90
Since it was decided, many circuits have merely trusted the court’s
reasoning and failed to engage in an independent analysis.91 This
Section outlines and evaluates three circuit court decisions to address
the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983; it also discusses the implications of
the Seventh Circuit’s Levin v. Madigan decision.
A. The Weight of Authority
1. Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department
In Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department, a city police
officer alleged that the police commissioner and the department
engaged in age-based employment discrimination.92 The officer
brought claims under § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection
Clause.93 To ascertain whether or not the ADEA precluded the

88

Id. at 250.
See Note 18.
90
David C. Miller, Note, Alone in Its Field: Judicial Trend to Hold That the
ADEA Preempts § 1983 in Age Discrimination in Employment Claims, 29 STETSON
L. REV. 573, 575 (2000).
91
See Note 15.
92
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 868 F.2d 1364, 1365 (4th Cir.
1989).
93
Id. The officer failed to timely file a complaint with the EEOC, The officer
did not file a charge with the ADEA. Colleen Gale Treml, Zombro v. Baltimore City
89
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officer’s § 1983 claim, the Fourth Circuit used the Sea Clammers
doctrine and focused on the ADEA’s comprehensive enforcement
scheme.94 As previously explained, the ADEA specifies that a charge
of age discrimination must be filed with the EEOC; the agency will
then investigate the charge and attempt to mediate the dispute.95 The
court opined that the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial scheme would
preclude § 1983 equal protection claims unless Congress manifestly
intended to permit other remedies.96
The Zombro court discovered Congress’ intent in the ADEA’s
damages provision.97 The ADEA incorporates the damages clause of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).98 To the Zombro court, the
incorporation of the FLSA’s damages provision evinced Congress’
intent to foreclose actions under § 1983:99 The FLSA’s remedy “is the
sole remedy available to [an] employee for enforcement of whatever
rights he may have under the FLSA.”100
Primarily, the Fourth Circuit was concerned that permitting
§ 1983 equal protection claims would “debilitate” the enforcement
mechanism provided in the ADEA.101 It feared that plaintiffs could
bypass the EEOC procedures by asserting § 1983 claims “merely
because they [were] employed by an agency operating under color of
state law.”102 Consequently, the court held that the ADEA precludes
§ 1983 equal protection claims for age-based employment
discrimination.103

Police Department: Pushing Plaintiffs Down the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination
Suits, 68 N.C. L. REV. 995, 996 (1990).
94
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367.
95
See supra Part (I)(A)(2).
96
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
97
Id.
98
See supra Part (I)(A)(3).
99
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
100
Id. at 1369 (citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F.Supp.
1027 (N.D. Calif. 1972)).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1369.
103
Id.
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2. Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education
Following Zombro, the Ninth Circuit, in Ahlmeyer v. Nevada
System of Higher Education, concluded that the ADEA precludes
§ 1983 equal protection claims.104 In Ahlmeyer, the plaintiff alleged
that her employer, a state actor, engaged in age-based employment
discrimination.105 Unlike younger workers, the plaintiff was denied a
request for an assistant.106 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s
ADEA claim because the State was entitled to sovereign immunity.107
In response, the plaintiff replaced her ADEA claim with a § 1983
equal protection claim.108
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the plaintiff was asserting a
constitutional claim under § 1983 and was not brining a § 1983 claim
to enforce violations of the ADEA.109 Even so, the court stated that the
Sea Clammers doctrine was the applicable preclusion standard:110
§ 1983 claims are not available where Congress’ intent to preclude can
be inferred from the passage of a comprehensive remedial scheme.111
The court found the Zombro reasoning “particularly persuasive” and
declared that it would not become the first circuit to contradict the
Zombro holding.112 The court concluded that the ADEA’s
comprehensive remedial scheme was enough to overcome the
presumption against implied preclusion.113
The court went on to rebut arguments put forth by district courts
that have disagreed with the Zombro reasoning.114 One district court
maintained that the Sea Clammers doctrine applies only to the
104

555 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1055.
110
Id. at 1055-1056.
111
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
20, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981).
112
Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1056.
113
Id. at 1057.
114
Id.
105
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preclusion of § 1983 claims predicated on statutory violations, not
constitution-based § 1983 claims.115 The Ninth Circuit cited Smith as
an example of the Supreme Court relying on a comprehensive
remedial scheme to preclude a § 1983 constitutional claim.116
Another district court argument was that state employees, without
the availability of § 1983, would be left without a federal remedy for
age discrimination in employment.117 The ADEA was amended to
allow suits against the States but the Supreme Court declared that
Congress did not validly abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity;
therefore, individuals cannot bring ADEA suits against state actors.118
The Ninth Circuit stated that courts must analyze the Act as it was
written.119 Consequently, the court held that the ADEA precludes
§ 1983 equal protection claims because it considered the amendment
as Congress’ intent to subsume constitutional violations into the
ADEA.120
B. Creating the Split
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided Levin v. Madigan.121 In
Levin, a fifty-five year old employee was terminated and replaced by a
worker in her thirties.122 The employee brought an ADEA claim and a
§ 1983 equal protection claim against the State of Illinois, the Office
of the Illinois Attorney General, and five supervisors in their
individual or official capacities.123 Because the plaintiff was not an
“employee” under the ADEA, his ADEA claim was dismissed.124
115

Id. at 1057-1058 (citing Mummelthie v. Mason City, Iowa, 873 F.Supp.
1293 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).
116
Id. at 1058.
117
Id. at 1060 (citing Mustafa v. State of Neb. Dep't of Correctional Servs., 196
F.Supp.2d 945 (D. Neb. 2002)).
118
See supra Part (I)(A)(1).
119
Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1060.
120
Id.
121
692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012).
122
Id. at 609.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 610.
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However, the district court concluded that the § 1983 equal protection
claim should proceed to trial.125 On appeal, the defendants asserted
that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age-based employment
discrimination.126
The Seventh Circuit started its analysis by outlining the Supreme
Court decisions limiting § 1983 relief.127 For constitution-based
§ 1983 claims, the court ascertained that congressional intent is
essential.128 Furthermore, the court established that Congress’ intent
can be inferred from the language of the statute, the legislative history,
the statute's context, the comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme,
and by a comparison of the rights and protections afforded by the
statute and the § 1983 claim.129
Firstly, the court noted the comprehensive remedial scheme of the
ADEA–filing with the EEOC, the EEOC investigatory process, and
conciliation and mediation efforts.130 However, the court declared that
a comprehensive remedial scheme evinces Congress’ intent to
preclude § 1983 claims predicated on statutory violations, not
constitutional violations.131 Consequently, the ADEA’s comprehensive
remedial scheme would not be enough to preclude § 1983 equal
protection claims without additional evidence of congressional
intent.132
The Seventh Circuit disputed the Zombro court’s contention that
Congress’ intent to preclude is implicit in the ADEA’s incorporation of
the FLSA's remedial provisions.133 In Levin, the court stated that the
FLSA’s remedial scheme evinced Congress’ intent to exclude § 1983
claims to enforce FLSA rights.134 Unlike the ADEA, the FLSA lacks a

125

Id.
Id.
127
Id. at 611-615.
128
Id. at 615.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 617.
132
Id. at 619.
133
Id. at 620.
134
Id.
126
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constitutional counterpart.135 Therefore, the FLSA is irrelevant in
determining the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983 equal protection
claims.136
Secondly, following Fitzgerald, the Seventh Circuit compared the
“rights and protections” afforded by the ADEA to the rights and
protections afforded under § 1983 equal protection claims.137 The
court deduced that the rights applied to different defendants and
different plaintiffs; it also noted that the two claims have different
standards of proof.138 Aside from the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial
scheme, the court was unable to discover additional congressional
intent to preclude.139 Thus, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit
to hold that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age-based
employment discrimination.140
C. Confusion in the Courts: What Happened to Step Number One?
In Smith, discussed supra, the Court announced a preclusion
analysis for constitution-based § 1983 claims.141 The Smith Court
stipulated that the first step, when dealing with the preclusion of
constitution-based § 1983 claims, is to determine if the statutory claim
and the constitutional claim are “virtually identical.”142 The question
presented before the courts in Zombro, Levin, and Ahlmeyer was: Does
the ADEA preclude § 1983 claims based on violations of the Equal

135

Id.
Id.
137
Id. at 621.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 619-622.
140
Id. at 622.
141
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
142
Id. at 1009.
136
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Protection Clause.143 Each court misconstrued the reasoning in Smith
and applied an improper preclusion analysis.
Zombro, Ahlmeyer, and Levin referenced Smith;144 however, each
Court interpreted the Smith reasoning differently. The Zombro court
likely interpreted Smith as declaring that a comprehensive remedial
scheme would preclude a constitution-based § 1983 claim unless there
was manifest congressional intent indicating otherwise.145 To the
Ahlmeyer court, Smith dictated that a statute’s comprehensive remedial
scheme was conclusive of Congress’ intent to preclude a constitutionbased § 1983 claim.146 To the Seventh Circuit, Smith enumerated that a
comprehensive remedial scheme would not preclude a constitutionbased § 1983 claim without additional congressional intent.147
Although the Smith Court engaged in a comprehensive remedial
scheme analysis, it first established that the rights of the § 1983 claim
were virtually identical to the statutory claim.148 Neither the Zombro or
Ahlmeyer court performed a “virtually identical” analysis. Instead, the
courts applied the Sea Clammer’s comprehensive remedial scheme
analysis designed for statute-based § 1983 claims.149

Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989);
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); Levin,
692 F.3d 607.
144
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368; Levin, 692 F.3d at 619; Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at
1058.
145
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368-1369 (“[T]he general policy of precluding § 1983
suits, where Congress has enacted a comprehensive statute specifically designed to
redress grievances alleged by the plaintiff, is as applicable in . . . cases where a
constitutional claim is attached to a statutory claim brought under § 1983. We hold
that this policy should be followed unless the legislative history of the
comprehensive statutory scheme in question manifests a congressional intent to
allow an individual to pursue independently rights under both the comprehensive
statutory scheme and other applicable state and federal statutes.”).
146
Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1058.
147
Levin, 692 F.3d at 619.
148
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
149
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366; Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1056.
143
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In Levin, the court concluded that a comprehensive remedial
scheme was not enough to preclude constitution-based § 1983
claims.150 Unlike the courts in Zombro and Ahlmeyer, the Seventh
Circuit required additional evidence of Congress’ intent to preclude.151
To find that additional evidence, the court followed the guidance of
Fitzgerald: The court engaged in a preclusion analysis that integrated a
comparison of the rights and protections of the ADEA to § 1983 equal
protection claims.152 Because the rights and protections significantly
differed, the court concluded that the ADEA did not preclude § 1983
equal protection claims.153
The Seventh Circuit properly recognized that additional evidence
of Congress’ intent to preclude is necessary for a comprehensive
remedial scheme to preclude a § 1983 constitutional claim. However,
the court looked to the comprehensiveness of the ADEA’s remedial
scheme before it engaged in a comparison of rights and protections.154
As stated above, Smith demonstrates that the first step when dealing
with the preclusion of § 1983 constitutional claims is to determine if
the statute and the § 1983 claim are virtually identical.155
Even though the Seventh Circuit did not correctly apply the
preclusion analysis, the court’s holding has major implications. For
instance, the ruling gives state employees within the Seventh Circuit a
federal forum for a state actor’s age-based employment discrimination.
Moreover, state employees in other circuits now have a stronger
foundation for bringing § 1983 equal protection claims.156 Most
150

Levin, 692 F.3d at 617-618.
Id.
152
Id. at 621.
153
Id. at 621-622.
154
Id. at 618.
155
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). The
Fitzgerald Court did not overturn the ruling in Smith and, consistent with Smith, the
Court engaged in what was likely a “virtually identical” analysis.
156
Cf. Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other
grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by
Migneault v. Peck, 204 F.3d 1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s § 1983
151
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important, circuits that have not addressed the ADEA’s preclusion of
§ 1983 will certainly have to contend with the Levin analysis; no other
circuit court has engaged in a comparative analysis or found the
ADEA not to preclude § 1983 equal protection claims. The Levin
decision will likely persuade other circuits to rule opposite of Zombro
and its progeny. Supreme Court review of the issue seems inevitable.
This Section examined three circuit court decisions dealing with
the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983 equal protection claims. It
demonstrated how three circuits interpreted Supreme Court preclusion
precedent differently. Ahlmeyer’s reliance on Zombro exemplifies that
courts do not understand which preclusion analysis to apply. Despite
being decided after Fitzgerald, the Ninth Circuit failed to mention the
Fitzgerald decision and did not engage in a comparative analysis, as
directed by Fitzgerald and Smith. The next Section of this Comment
proposes the proper standard for determining the preclusion of
constitution-based § 1983 claim.
IV. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE PRECLUSION OF
CONSTITUTION-BASED § 1983 CLAIMS: SYNERGIZING SMITH,
FITZGERALD, AND SEA CLAMMERS
In order to determine if the ADEA precludes § 1983 equal
protection claims, courts must understand the proper preclusion
analysis. The previous Section indicates that circuit courts do not
comprehend Supreme Court preclusion precedent. The Supreme
Court’s Smith decision was understood three different ways by three
different courts and the Ninth Circuit altogether disregarded the
Court’s preclusion analysis in Fitzgerald.157 This Comment proposes
the following interpretation of Supreme Court precedent:

equal protection claim was dismissed because the plaintiff cited no authority
contrary to Zombro).
157
See Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989);
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); Levin v.
Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555
U.S. 246 (2009).
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A. Step One: Smith and Fitzgerald: Are the Rights and Protections
Offered Under the Statute Virtually Identical to the Rights and
Protections Offered under the § 1983 Constitutional Claim?
When ascertaining Congress’ intent to preclude, courts should
bear in mind that statutory repeals by implication are disfavored.158
With that said, Smith mandates that courts should first evaluate
whether or not the statutory claim and the constitution-based § 1983
claim are “virtually identical.”159 Although the Smith Court did not
expand on its virtually identical analysis, in 2009 the Fitzgerald court
engaged in what was likely a Smith evaluation by comparing “the
rights and protections of the statute [to] those existing under the
Constitution.”160 If the rights and protections are virtually identical, it
indicates that Congress viewed the statute as the “most effective
vehicle for protecting the constitutional right.”161 Consequently, the
reviewing court should move to the second step of the analysis.
However, if the “rights and protections diverge in significant ways,” a
court should infer that Congress did not intend to preclude the
constitution-based § 1983 claim;162 the analysis is over and the statute
does not preclude the § 1983 claim.
B. Step Two: Sea Clammers: If the Rights and Protections are Virtually
Identical, is there Additional Congressional Intent to Preclude?
A court should only move to the second step if the rights of the
statute and the constitution-based claim are virtually identical.163 At
158

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (a cardinal
principle of statutory construction is that “repeals by implication are not favored”).
159
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009.
160
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009).
161
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1013.
162
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-253.
163
See generally Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude
Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1470 (1998) (“Under Smith . . . even
if a plaintiff raises a Section 1983 claim predicated on a constitutional right that is
identical to the right conferred by a statute, that statute will not preclude the Section
1983 claim unless the court finds that Congress intended such preclusion.”).
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this step, a court should apply the Sea Clammers doctrine to determine
whether or not Congress intended the statute to be the exclusive
remedial avenue. Congressional intent can be inferred from the
statute’s context,164 the legislative history,165 or from the existence of a
comprehensive enforcement scheme.166 If the statute contains a
comprehensive remedial scheme, or there are other indicia of
congressional intent to preclude, the statute subsumed the
constitutional right and the § 1983 claim is precluded.
C. Why this Proposal?
1. Where rights and protections differ, a comprehensive remedial
scheme will not be bypassed.
Where the rights and protections offered by a statute differ from
the rights and protections offered by a constitution-based § 1983
claim, it is inappropriate to apply the Sea Clammers doctrine. In Sea
Clammers, the Court held that when a statute contains a
comprehensive remedial scheme, statute-based § 1983 claims allow
plaintiffs to proceed to federal court based on violations of a statute
that commands a different enforcement path.167 Statutes containing
comprehensive remedial schemes would become frivolous if plaintiffs
could bring violations of the statute directly to the unbiased federal
forum by utilizing § 1983.168
The circumvention concern also exists with constitution-based
§ 1983 claims but only if the rights and protections are virtually
identical to the statutory claim. If constitutional protections are
virtually identical to statutory protections, a plaintiff filing a § 1983
164

City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
165
See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1006 (the Court investigated the legislative history to
discover Congress’ intent).
166
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
20 (1981).
167
Id.
168
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1011.
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constitutional claim is enforcing what are essentially statutory
violations in federal court. Consequently, the plaintiff procures the
benefits of federal court, bringing what is effectively a statutory claim,
but is able to sidestep the remedial scheme of the statute. This is
indistinguishable from a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim to enforce
statutory violations where the statute has a comprehensive remedial
scheme that mandates a different remedial path: in both instances, the
plaintiff is bypassing a statute’s remedial avenue to enforce statutory
rights or significantly similar rights in federal court.
Notably, the circumvention concern is not present when the
§ 1983 constitutional claim and the statutory claim have divergent
rights and protections. When Congress includes a comprehensive
remedial scheme in a statute, it anticipates that the scheme will be
used to enforce rights protected by that statute; it does not anticipate
that the scheme will be utilized to enforce distinct rights secured by
another body of law. Simply put, a plaintiff is not bypassing a statute’s
comprehensive remedial scheme by brining a § 1983 claim to
vindicate distinct rights external to the statute.
2. Another interpretation of Fitzgerald?
This Comment interprets Fitzgerald as an expansion of the
“virtually identical” analysis revealed in Smith. However, based on
Fitzgerald, an argument could be made that the proper analysis begins
with the existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme. In Fitzgerald,
the Court applied the Sea Clammers doctrine before it compared rights
and protections.169 The Court then stated that the lack of similarity
between the constitution-based § 1983 claim and the statutory claim
“len[t] further support” to the conclusion that the § 1983 claim could
not be precluded.170 This could be construed as evidence that a
comprehensive remedial scheme is the first step for determining the
preclusion of any § 1983 claim.

169
170

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009).
Id. at 256.
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However, unlike the Courts in Smith and Sea Clammers,
Fitzgerald dealt with the preclusion of a statute-based § 1983 claim
and a constitution-based § 1983 claim.171 Because the Court addressed
the § 1983 statutory claim first, it engaged in a Sea Clammer’s analysis
first. Accordingly, the Fitzgerald Court’s initial discussion of Sea
Clammer’s could be attributed to its formatting of the issues. At best,
Fitzgerald is ambiguous and it is unclear which analysis applies first
to the preclusion of constitution-based § 1983 claims.172 Since the
Fitzgerald decision did not overrule the Smith test, it should be read as
an expansion of the virtually identical analysis.
V. THE ADEA DOES NOT PRECLUDE § 1983 EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIMS FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
The question this Comment seeks to answer is: Does the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) preclude § 1983 claims to
vindicate violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? This Comment’s preclusion standard, discussed supra,
applies to § 1983 claims based on constitutional rights. Accordingly,
this Section utilizes this Comment’s preclusion analysis and evaluates
whether the rights of the ADEA are virtually identical to the rights of
§ 1983 equal protection claims. By expanding on the Seventh Circuit’s
assessment in Levin v. Madigan, this Section concludes that the ADEA
171

Id. at 250.
It is unclear which analysis would come first based on the language in
Fitzgerald. In one section the Court states that “[a] comparison of the substantive
rights and protections guaranteed under Title IX and under the Equal Protection
Clause lends further support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX
to preclude § 1983 constitutional suits.” Id. at 256 (emphasis added). This language
might indicate that the comparative analysis would come second to the
comprehensive remedial scheme analysis. The Fitzgerald Court also provided: “In
light of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, as well
as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue in
Sea Clammers . . . we conclude that Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive
mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools.” Id. at 258 (emphasis
added). This language suggests that the comprehensive remedial scheme analysis is
secondary to the comparative analysis.
172
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is not the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment. To
finish, this Section reveals why it is inappropriate to apply the Sea
Clammer’s doctrine to the ADEA and § 1983.
A. The Rights and Protections Under the ADEA are not “Virtually
Identical” to the Rights and Protections of § 1983 Equal Protection
Claims
To determine if a federal statute precludes a constitution-based
§ 1983 claim, the first step is to apply the “virtually identical”
analysis.173 That analysis demands a comparison of the rights and
protections of the statute to those available under the Constitution.174
When the “contours of such rights and protections diverge in
significant ways,” Congress did not intend to preclude the
constitution-based § 1983 claims.175 In Levin, the Seventh Circuit
engaged in an inclusive comparison of the rights offered under the
ADEA to those existing under § 1983 equal protection claims.176 That
assessment has tremendous value to the preclusion analysis and is
expanded on here:
First, there are several divergences concerning who can be sued
under the ADEA and who can be sued under § 1983.177 The ADEA
only restricts private employers, the federal government, unions, and
employment agencies.178 Conversely, a § 1983 plaintiff may file suit
against persons acting under color of state law.179 Persons acting under
color of state law include individuals in their personal or official
capacities.180 In certain situations, liability under § 1983 can also
extend to municipal and county governmental entities.181 If the ADEA
173

See supra Part (IV)(A).
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252.
175
Id. at 252-53.
176
Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2012).
177
Id.
178
29 U.S.C.A. § 630 (2006).
179
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2006).
180
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
181
Id. (“Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to
174
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precludes § 1983 equal protection claims, the number of potential
defendants shrinks substantially. For instance, employees would be
unable to bring age-based discrimination claims against culpable
individuals acting under color of state law.
Second, the ADEA and § 1983 protect different types of
employees.182 The ADEA excludes from its protection elected officials
and limits protection for certain members of their staff, appointees,
law enforcement officers, and firefighters.183 The ADEA also limits its
protection to employees over the age of forty;184 it does not prevent
employers from favoring older employees. The constitution does not
have similar limitations.185 Significantly, without § 1983 equal
protection claims, employees under the age of forty who are
discriminated against because of age, will be left remediless for
otherwise actionable employment discrimination.186
Moreover, if the ADEA precludes § 1983 equal protection claims,
state employees are left without a federal forum for age
discrimination.187 Interestingly, this lack of federal remedy did not
trouble the Ninth Circuit in Ahlmeyer.188 In Ahlmeyer, the court held
that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 claims when it amended
the ADEA to include state employers.189 However, according to the
Supreme Court, what the ADEA amendment actually evinced was
be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.”).
182
Levin, 692 F.3d at 621.
183
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 630(f)); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch.
Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009) (Court found preclusion inappropriate where the
statutory exemptions would have rights under § 1983 equal protection claim)).
184
29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a).
185
Levin, 692 F.3d at 621.
186
Stephanie Armour, Young Workers Say Their Age Holds Them Back, USA
TODAY, Oct. 7, 2003, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace
/2003-10-07-reverseage_x.htm (“In this tepid economy, some workers in their 20s
and 30s say their age is being unfairly held against them”).
187
See e.g., Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp.
2d 945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002); Levin, 692 F.3d at 621.
188
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.
2009).
189
Id.
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Congress’ intent to provide state employees with a federal remedy for
age-based employment discrimination.190 Because the amendment was
overturned, the ADEA is not applicable against the States by private
federal suit.191 Accordingly, a court that precludes § 1983 equal
protection claims is disregarding Congress’ intent to provide state
employees with a federal remedy.192 Without the availability of § 1983
equal protection claims, state employees suffering form age-based
employment discrimination will be left without a federal cause of
action.193
Third, the two claims have different standards of proof.194 An
equal protection claim is subject only to rational basis review, meaning
the age classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.195 A court will not find a State’s action unlawful unless the
different treatment “is so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes” that the only conclusion is the
State’s conduct was irrational.196 Rational basis of review is so
deferential that a court may even hypothesize a State’s legitimate
interest if the State does not provide one.197 As such, an individual
challenging the constitutionality of an age-based employment
classification bears a heavy burden.198 In contrast, an ADEA plaintiff

Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 74 (2000) (“the plain
language of [the ADEA’s] provisions clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to
subject the States to suit . . . at the hands of individual employees” in federal court).
191
Id. at 91.
192
Mustafa, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 956.
193
See e.g. Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp.
2d 945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002); Levin, 692 F.3d at 621.
194
Levin, 692 F.3d at 619.
195
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83–84.
196
Id. at 84.
197
Shoshana Zimmerman, Note, Pushing the Boundaries?: Equal Protection,
Rational Basis, and Rational Decision Making by District Courts in Cases
Challenging Legislative Classifications on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 21 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 727, 735 (2012).
198
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979))
(“[B]ecause an age classification is presumptively rational, the individual
challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving that the ‘facts on which
190
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need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a
“but-for” cause of an employer’s decision.199 As the Seventh Circuit
notes, the ADEA “prohibits substantially more state employment
decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”200
In Ahlmeyer, the Ninth Circuit found the difference of proof
problematic.201 Because the ADEA provides greater protection,
plaintiffs have “nothing substantive to gain” by bringing a § 1983
equal protection claim.202 The Ninth Circuit’s assumption is incorrect
because without § 1983 equal protection claims, state employees
suffering from age-based employment discrimination and employees
suffering from reverse age discrimination are left without a federal
remedy. Moreover, even if plaintiffs had nothing substantive to gain,
that would not change the fact that the standards of proof are different.
The important question is whether the claims are virtually identical203
and the difference in proof is another example that they are not.
Fourth, § 1983 commonly has a more generous limitations period
than the ADEA.204 Under the ADEA, an individual must file a claim
with the EEOC, usually within 180 days of the employer’s
misconduct.205 By contrast, the limitations period for § 1983 equal
protection claims is likely to be substantially longer because it is
adopted from the State’s statute of limitations for personal injury

the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by
the governmental decisionmaker.’”).
199
Gross v. FBL Fin. Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009).
200
Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2012); accord Kimel, 528
U.S. at 87 (“Measured against the rational basis standard . . . the ADEA plainly
imposes substantially higher burdens”).
201
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.
2009).
202
Id.
203
See supra Part (IV)(A).
204
Stephen Bergstein, Age Discrimination Can Violate Section 1983,
(June 29, 2008, 1:47 PM), http://secondcircuitcivilrights.blogspot.com/2008/06/agediscrimination-can-violate-section.html (Section 1983 equal protection claims have a
“longer statute of limitations than the ADEA: three years to 300 days.”).
205
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (2006).
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suits.206 The longer statute of limitations should provide state
employees with greater rights and protections against age
discrimination in employment. However, if § 1983 equal protection
claims are precluded, the statute of limitations is worthless; state
employees will not even be able to file a federal suit.
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized substantial differences
between the ADEA and Equal Protection Clause claims. In Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, supra, the Court held that the ADEA did not
validly abrogate the States sovereign immunity and therefore, the
ADEA is not applicable against the States.207 As part of its analysis,
the Court compared the ADEA’s protections to Equal Protection
Clause guarantees.208 The Court made two points that are crucial to
this Comment’s analysis: (1) the ADEA “cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,”209
and (2) “the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held
unconstitutional.”210
The Court’s language establishes that there is a constitutional right
to be free from age-based employment discrimination211 and the
ADEA does not fully enforce violations of that right. It is an
“indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded.”212 If the ADEA precludes
§ 1983 equal protection claims, state employees and employees
suffering from reverse age discrimination will have the constitutional
right to be free from age-based employment discrimination, but may
have no remedy for its violation. That conclusion would be odd;
especially since § 1983 was created to remedy such unconstitutional
conduct.213
206

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985).
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
208
See Id. at 83-91.
209
Id. at 82 (internal citation omitted).
210
Id. at 88.
211
See also Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that
Kimel clearly established that age discrimination in employment violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
212
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
213
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
207
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It is apparent that the rights and protections offered by the ADEA
are not “virtually identical” to the rights and protections offered by
§ 1983 equal protection claims. Therefore, it is unnecessary to apply
step two and search for additional evidence of Congress’ intent.
According to this Comment’s proposed preclusion analysis, the
different rights establish that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983
equal protection claims to vindicate age discrimination in
employment.
B. A Final Word of the Inappropriateness of the Sea Clammers
Doctrine: The ADEA’s Comprehensive Remedial Scheme Will not be
Bypassed by § 1983 Equal Protection Claims
The Zombro court’s central argument was that the ADEA’s
comprehensive remedial scheme would be debilitated if plaintiffs
could file § 1983 equal protection claims.214 Specifically, the court was
concerned that plaintiffs—in order to bring claims directly to the
unbiased federal court—would assert § 1983 claims and circumvent
the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial scheme.215
Undoubtedly, the remedial scheme of the ADEA is
comprehensive. The ADEA’s remedial scheme, including the filing
and other procedural requirements with the EEOC,216 is on par with
the scheme declared comprehensive in Smith.217 The scheme evinces
Congress’ intent for the ADEA to be the sole means of vindicating
violations of the ADEA; it does not establish that Congress intended
the ADEA to be the sole means of enforcing violations of the Equal
214

Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir.

1989).
215

Id.
29 U.S.C.A. § 626.
217
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-1011 (1984) superseded by statute,
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796,
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Court found
the Education of the Handicapped Act a comprehensive remedial scheme because it
contained procedures that allowed for “each child's individual educational needs be
worked out through a process that begins on the local level and includes . . . detailed
procedural safeguards and a right to judicial review”).
216
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Protection Clause.218 This is especially true given the different rights
and protections offered by § 1983 equal protection claims.
Hypothetically, if the claims were virtually identical, allowing a
plaintiff to file a § 1983 equal protection claim would be
indistinguishable from a plaintiff filing a § 1983 claim based on
violations of the ADEA: the plaintiff filing the § 1983 equal protection
claim is circumventing the remedial scheme of the ADEA in order to
vindicate what are essentially ADEA violations.
However, § 1983 equal protection claims reach different
defendants, protect different employees, and have different standards
of proof than ADEA claims.219 According to the proper reading of
Smith, Fitzgerald, and Sea Clammers, no court could conclude that
Congress perceived the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment: the protections guaranteed by the two
sources of law are substantially different.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s Levin v. Madigan decision, a string
of circuit court cases rendered the ADEA the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment.220 These circuits left their state
employees without a federal remedy for age-based employment
discrimination and slowly created a weight of authority that no circuit
would rule against. When the Ninth Circuit disregarded Supreme
Court precedent in favor of Zombro and its progeny, the validity of the
weight of authority needed to be questioned. The Seventh Circuit
answered the call. Following Fitzgerald, the Seventh Circuit properly
compared the rights and protections of the ADEA to § 1983 equal
protection claims and concluded that the ADEA is not the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination in employment.221 However, even the
218

Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Ia., 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1327 (N.D.
Iowa 1995) aff'd sub nom. Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa, 78 F.3d 589
(8th Cir. 1996).
219
See supra Part (V)(A).
220
See Note 18.
221
Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012).

248

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/9

32

Duncan: The Proper Preclusion Standard: Why the ADEA Is Not the Exclusive

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 1

Fall 2012

Seventh Circuit was slightly misguided in its application of Supreme
Court precedent. Due to circuit court confusion, this Comment
provides the proper standard for determining the preclusion of
constitution-based § 1983 claims. Using this standard, this Comment
expands on the Seventh Circuit’s comparative assessment and
correctly concludes that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 equal
protection claims. In order to protect all employees from age
discrimination, courts must come to the understanding that the ADEA
and § 1983 equal protection claims are simply alternative methods of
fighting age-based employment discrimination as each supplies
different rights and protections.
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